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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the current conflict in Anglophone 
Cameroon and examines the role of civil society organisations 
(CSOs) in conflict resolution. In doing so, it explores a paradox in 
the peacebuilding literature. On the one hand, the ‘local turn’ in 
peacebuilding has emphasised a bottom-up approach that high-
lights the role of CSOs. On the other hand, the literature on ‘shrink-
ing civic space’ has demonstrated how space for CSOs’ activities has 
become increasingly restricted, especially in authoritarian contexts 
like Cameroon. The article investigates the contributions of CSOs to 
conflict resolution, the constraints faced, and their responses in turn 
to mitigate such constraints. CSOs’ contribution to conflict resolu-
tion is at least three-fold: to engage with most-affected commu-
nities and build an evidence base of the conflict’s adverse 
consequences for civilians; to draw national and international atten-
tion to the conflict; and to maintain pressure for a negotiated 
settlement through public protests and interactions with both 
government and non-state armed groups. Despite facing intimida-
tion and violence at times, CSOs have responded in innovative ways 
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Introduction
Cameroon is currently in a critical situation and facing unparalleled political violence. 
The ‘Anglophone’ conflict is an oft-overlooked civil war ongoing since October 2017 
between state security forces and armed separatist groups fighting for an independent 
state – the Republic of Ambazonia – in the two English-speaking Northwest and 
Southwest regions, the former British Southern Cameroons. With the military’s counter- 
insurgency campaign focused on rural areas, there has been a devastating impact on poor 
rural citizens and their livelihoods, with many civilians killed and homes and businesses 
burnt down.1 Almost daily violence and atrocities has led to hundreds of thousands 
fleeing the violence.2
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Accurate data on the impact of the conflict are difficult to access, mainly due to 
government suppression of information, and figures often remain outdated. In 2019, the 
International Crisis Group estimated that the conflict had claimed over 3000 lives.3 This 
figure has increased substantially since then, with estimates ranging from 4000 to 12,000 
killed.4 In 2018, UNICEF reported over 200 villages burnt and over 750,000 people 
internally and externally displaced, and 1.3 million people in need of humanitarian 
assistance.5 In 2019, 80 per cent of schools were closed and more than 700,000 children 
were out of school due to a school boycott enforced by the separatist groups in protest 
against educational injustices in English-speaking regions.6 Human rights reports show 
that rape and other forms of gender-based violence have increased dramatically, as well 
as documenting arbitrary killings, unlawful imprisonment, torture and kidnappings.7
Both warring sides bear a heavy responsibility for atrocities, though documentary 
evidence indicates that Cameroonian security forces are responsible for a majority of the 
killings and burning of homes, and for a greater level of indiscriminate violence.8 While 
some recent reports show a decline in the violence, especially in the cities, this by no 
means indicates a return to peace. For instance, a June 2021 UNOCHA report indicates 
some internally displaced persons (IDPs) returning to their villages, yet equally docu-
ments persistent violence causing over 10,000 people to leave their communities in 
Menchum Division alone.9 As we write (September 2021), there are government reports 
of 28 people killed, 15 troops and 13 civilians in a separatist attack on a military convoy, 
with a harsh military response anticipated.10
There is clearly an urgent need to end this terrible violence and resolve the conflict. Yet 
there is a current impasse. The main official attempt at conflict resolution thus far was the 
government-organised ‘Major National Dialogue’ from 30th September to 
4 October 2019. This was unsuccessful and criticised for being elite-oriented and 
excluding key actors.11 Not only were major non-state armed groups excluded12 but 
also the participation of peaceful civil society groups, especially women’s organisations, 
was limited.13 Some analysts even doubted the sincerity of the government,14 with the 
military crackdown in the Anglophone regions intensifying immediately afterwards,15 
and the government seemingly determined to pursue a military solution. Additionally, 
international offers from the Swiss government and the Vatican to mediate peace talks 
have been rejected.16
Therefore, in a context where top-down peacebuilding efforts have not made progress 
towards resolving the conflict, what can a bottom-up approach offer? In recent times the 
scholarly literature on the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding has placed more emphasis on 
a bottom-up or grassroots approach, inclusive of the role of civil society organisations 
(CSOs). Yet this stands somewhat in contradiction to another recent strand in academic 
and practitioner literature concerning ‘shrinking civic space’.17 This examines how 
governments globally have enacted legislation and adopted informal measures to limit 
the scope and activity of civil society.18 Therefore this article investigates this apparent 
paradox. On the one hand, the role of CSOs in peacebuilding from below is often 
perceived as positive and significant in seeking more lasting and legitimate peace agree-
ments. Yet, on the other hand, such bottom-up peacebuilding is limited by the restric-
tions being imposed on civil society actors in contexts of shrinking civic space. The 
following three questions are explored:
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● In what ways have Cameroonian CSOs engaged in efforts to resolve conflict and 
build peace?
● To what extent have such efforts been constrained by shrinking civic space?
● By what means have CSOs sought to overcome such constraints?
Cameroon’s war provides a suitable context to address such questions. The research 
focuses on peacebuilding as the overarching concept, within which conflict resolution is 
perceived as an essential element.
Methodology
This article is based on primary data collected by the authors between January and 
May 2020 as part of an academic research project funded by Coventry University. The 
main data collection method was a full-day ‘consultative dialogue workshop’, held in 
Douala, Cameroon on 29 January 2020, with representatives from 15 Cameroonian 
CSOs. The CSOs were all non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with professionally 
qualified staff, and ranged from women’s organisations to youth-led associations, human 
rights groups, a teachers’ association, and humanitarian and development organisations. 
They included national organisations and regional and local ones. All were operational in 
the Southwest and/or Northwest regions. Two were national branches of international 
organisations. The purpose of the workshop was to encourage CSOs to engage in 
mutually beneficial discussion and reflection on the current conflict and their roles in 
its mitigation and resolution. Follow-up semi-structured interviews were held in 
May 2020 with senior representatives from six of the participating CSOs.
The article is structured as follows. The second section situates the research within 
these two apparently contradictory strands of scholarly literature: ‘peacebuilding from 
below’ and ‘shrinking civic space’. The third provides background information on the 
Cameroon Anglophone conflict. The fourth, fifth and sixth sections address the three 
research questions in turn. The conclusion discusses the findings and provides final 
reflections.
Peacebuilding from below and shrinking civic space
Historically, interventions in civil war situations have been predominantly top-down, 
commonly led by international organisations, especially the United Nations, with the 
consent of national governments. These elite-level approaches have focused on the for-
mulation and implementation of official peace agreements. However, such top-down 
approaches have been subject to criticism. Pearson emphasises that elite approaches to 
resolving ethno-political conflicts can be problematic because they undermine trust, and 
outcomes often do not reflect the needs of most-affected local populations.19 Labonte 
concurs, noting that elite approaches enable those in authority to ‘control, shape and 
manipulate decision-making processes or institutions’ for their personal interests at the 
cost of the populace.20 In response, a bottom-up or grassroots approach, often associated 
with Lederach,21 has increasingly taken centre-stage in peacebuilding discourses.22 This 
places emphasis on the ‘significance of local actors and of the non-governmental sector and 
the links with local knowledge and wisdom’.23 Some analysts consider such ‘peacebuilding 
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from below’ as essential to resolving conflicts,24 notably in Africa, given that such 
approaches create space for the needs, perspectives and practices of local communities to 
be included in peace processes.25 Further, as noted by Urlacher, bottom-up approaches 
recognise the efforts of local communities in navigating and mitigating daily challenges in 
the midst of conflict.26 The interaction of NGOs with local communities is also significant 
and may commence with the provision of humanitarian relief, considered by Bigdon and 
Korf as an important element in transforming a conflict.27 In his discussion on ‘everyday 
peace’, Mac Ginty further argues for the recognition of such local peace initiatives if 
peacebuilding is to be sustainable.28 In other words, such initiatives should be recognised 
by the state and the international community in order to have maximum impact, parti-
cularly at the national level. For instance, in Liberia, the efforts of the Inter-Religious 
Council, a civil society group, were leveraged by ECOWAS and members of the interna-
tional community to initiate dialogue between warring factions and make recommenda-
tions regarding the peace agreement.29 Especially important is the centrality of gender and 
acknowledgement of the unique and crucial contribution of women to peacebuilding.30
However, as Ramsbotham et al. note, peacebuilding from below is not a panacea nor 
without its complexities.31 Local communities are also ‘sites of power asymmetry, 
patriarchy and privilege’,32 and traditional communal relations may have been replaced 
by ‘new militaristic tendencies’.33 Civil society can itself be clientelist in nature,34 and 
local groups may not be benign actors but themselves subject to ‘national and regional 
power plays’.35 Additionally, a bottom-up approach to resolving conflicts is unlikely to be 
sufficient in itself. It can bring the perspectives, needs and interests of conflict-affected 
communities to peace negotiations, but resolution of conflict is likely to be formalised in 
national-level agreements and in governmental structures and legal frameworks. 
Therefore, an interplay between local and national levels is required, perhaps mediated 
by legally registered and professionally staffed NGOs. However, this potential role is also 
influenced by the extent to which CSOs are affected by ‘shrinking civic space’.
Post-cold war, in the 1990s, with the perceived triumph of liberal democracy and an 
emphasis on the importance of civil and political rights, there was an increase globally in 
the number and significance of civil society associations, inclusive of NGOs, social 
movements and grassroots organisations.36 Civil society was seen as a key element of 
a new triadic approach that involved the state, market and civil society.37 This enhanced 
role of CSOs entailed an expansion of ‘civic space’, defined as ‘the public arena in which 
citizens can freely intervene and organise themselves with a view to defending their 
interests, values and identities; to claim their rights; to influence public policy making or 
call power holders to account’.38 From the mid-2000s, however, this expansion has been 
followed by the opposite phenomenon of ‘shrinking civic space’ whereby governments 
globally have sought to restrict the scope of civil society activity through legal and extra- 
legal measures.39 Since 2012, the annual CIVICUS State of Civil Society Report has 
identified an overall global trend of growing civic space restrictions.40 The CIVICUS 
Monitor provides tracking and rating of 196 countries, with 111 countries currently 
identified as ‘under attack’ where civic space is ‘closed’, ‘repressed’ or ‘obstructed’.41
While the opening of civic space in the 1990s was associated with political liberalisation 
and democratisation, its subsequent closure is correspondingly linked with the global 
resurgence of authoritarianism and the consolidation of hybrid regimes in the past 
decade.42 Governments across the world are seen as seeking to (re-)assert state power and 
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push back against perceived civil society influence and power.43 In this respect, the drivers of 
shrinking space are largely a function of ‘wider political struggles between political, civic and 
economic actors’, most notably in contexts of autocratic governance.44 Such governments 
increasingly constrain CSO activity under the guise of security threats, for instance from 
‘terrorism’ or migration; or assert national sovereignty against external intervention, for 
example by limiting foreign funding of NGOs; or simply use restrictive measures to limit the 
activities of non-state actors engaged in struggles for social and political change.45 The 
highly political nature of whose space is shrunk is also highlighted in what the Transnational 
Institute (TNI) calls ‘shades of shrinking space’, noting that ‘not everyone’s space is 
shrinking in the same way’, and asserting that grassroots organisations and social justice 
movements are bearing the brunt of crackdowns by authoritarian governments.46 Further, 
TNI claims that ‘“shrinking space” is simply a . . . way of talking about the problems of 
exclusion and repression that many social, political and civil rights movements have long 
faced’.47 Such analysis is of particular relevance when it comes to the Cameroon case.
As noted, measures to shrink space are both legal and repressive (extra-legal). Legal 
and administrative restrictions include laws and regulations on registration and on 
foreign funding.48 Extra-legal measures include violence and intimidation at the hands 
of both state and non-state actors, with the latter often acting with the de facto protection 
of state authorities such as the police.49 Other repressive measures include surveillance 
and censorship by the state, for example internet cuts, banning demonstrations, and 
discrediting and delegitimising particular CSOs.50
There has been less emphasis among analysts on how to counter shrinking civic space, 
mainly limited to a focus on international responses.51 One partial exception is the work of 
Bossuyt and Ronceray who explore the responses to closing space of local CSOs and 
activists.52 They outline four types of local responses: resistance, adaptation, desisting, and 
disbanding,53 although only the first two challenge constraints and claim back space. 
Hypothetical examples of each type of response are given.54 For instance, ‘resistance’ could 
entail: mobilising of citizens and youth movements; or carefully choosing advocacy cam-
paigns that avoid repression. Examples of ‘adaptation’ include: combining advocacy work 
with service delivery; less confrontational lobbying campaigns, with some self-censorship. 
‘Desisting’ could involve moving away from advocacy to service delivery; while ‘disbanding’ 
entails closing down or going ‘off the radar’ and not operating publicly. Other writings on 
shrinking civic space only consider local responses briefly. For instance, Karaman and 
Cernov assert that activists are ‘re-imagining their strategies’ and ‘reclaiming democratic 
spaces and pushing back the backlash’.55 Strategies are similar to those cited as ‘adaptation’ 
and include cross-movement collaboration, such as alliances between women’s rights and 
minority rights movements, and creating spaces for movements ‘to meet, collaborate and 
learn from each other’.56 TNI emphasise the importance of ‘solidarity’, especially with ‘those 
on the margins whose political space is being . . . radically restricted’,57 although such 
expressions of solidarity would come mainly from external like-minded organisations. 
Utilising this limited extant literature, the local responses to shrinking space by CSOs in 
Cameroon will be examined (below) with reference to the concepts of: resistance, adaptation, 
collaboration and solidarity.
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The ‘Anglophone’ conflict in Cameroon and civic space
The conflict in the English-speaking regions of Cameroon is firmly rooted in the 
country’s colonial past. Originally a German colony, after World War I German 
Kamerun was split between France and Britain as ‘trust territories’ under the League 
of Nations, but in an uneven division of 80:20 in France’s favour.58 Numerous 
scholars59 have explored how this unequal partition sowed the seeds of what is 
commonly referred to as the ‘Anglophone problem’ in Cameroon.60 Here, we summar-
ise key moments.
At the time of independence in 1960/61, the British territory (named Southern 
Cameroons) was offered a plebiscite to join either newly independent Nigeria or 
French Cameroon. Southern Cameroonians voted to join La Republique du Cameroun, 
leading to the formation of the Federal Republic of Cameroon from 1 October 1961 as an 
indissoluble federal system composed of two equal parts.61 However, what followed was 
the gradual centralisation of power and unilateral dissolution of the federal structures by 
the dominant French-speaking government. In May 1972, under President Ahidjo, 
a controversial referendum abolished the federal system and created a unitary state 
named as the United Republic of Cameroon.62 Subsequently, in 1984, President Biya 
renamed the country as La Republique du Cameroun, thereby reinstating the name 
adopted at independence on 1 January 1960, before reunification with the former 
British Southern Cameroons. As Fombad notes, ‘This was seen by many Anglophone 
Cameroonians as removing one of the last symbolic vestiges of the 1961 reunification of 
the two distinct communities’.63
During this period, protests by Anglophone Cameroonians against their margin-
alisation and gradual assimilation into a centralised, Francophone-dominated unitary 
state were met with repressive force.64 Yet, as the wave of political liberalisation and 
democratisation spread across sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s,65 President Biya 
was forced to accede to pressure for political reforms and opened up a limited measure 
of political and civic space. Multi-partyism was reinstated in December 1990 with the 
enactment of Law No. 90/053 on freedom of association, and the first major opposi-
tion party, the Social Democrat Front (SDF), was established in Bamenda, the capital 
of Northwest region.66 This degree of tolerance for freedoms of expression and 
association in the early 1990s led to developments in both the political and civic 
spheres.
The degree of political liberalisation allowed for greater mobilisation and represen-
tation of Anglophone interests, inclusive of the formation of pro-federalist (the All- 
Anglophone Congress) and secessionist (the Ambazonia Movement) groups.67 Law 
No. 90/053 also opened up space for civil society to expand, and a mushrooming of 
over 3,000 registered associations occurred, including development NGOs, trade 
unions, cooperative movements, private media, professional associations, student asso-
ciations and feminist organisations.68 Amongst these associations, however, were state- 
created organisations or government-oriented NGOs (GONGOs), with little indepen-
dence from government. Nonetheless, CSOs became increasingly involved in various 
aspects of life in Cameroon, spanning social, religious, cultural, economic and political 
spheres.
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Yet, the political space shrunk almost as quickly as it emerged, with military crack-
downs on protests and violent clashes with the army across the country between March 
and August 1991, with many deaths recorded.69 Nyambo notes that the attitude of the 
state in creating a legal space for civic action in Cameroon ‘has been one of both caution 
and repression’.70 Thus, politically, there were limits to CSOs’ activities, constraints that 
remain to this day.
The current crisis (2016 to present) and shrinking civic space
Longstanding Anglophone grievances re-emerged in 2016 with rising opposition to the 
government’s sustained erosion of the distinct legal and education systems of the 
English-speaking regions, notably with the appointment of ever-increasing numbers of 
French-speaking judges and teachers.71 Peaceful protests were organised in October 2016 
by lawyers, demanding that adjudication of court cases in the Anglophone regions should 
be in English and in accordance with the Common Law system. The lawyers were joined 
by teachers, students and parents who were similarly opposed to the appointment of 
French-speaking teachers in Anglophone schools, resulting in the poor performance of 
students in examinations. For some, the protests were a response to years of margin-
alisation and oppression of Anglophone Cameroonians, as noted by one research parti-
cipant: ‘If you trace it back, Anglophones have always felt marginalised in all aspects. So it 
is something that has been gradually nursing up [building up]. So the lawyers’ protest was 
actually a catalyst’.72
However, government security forces responded to these peaceful protests with 
repression, using tear gas and bullets to disperse protesters, with several killed.73 While 
the initial demand was for a return to the pre-1972 federal system and greater autonomy 
for the Anglophone regions, the military crackdown led to more radical separatist groups 
taking centre-stage, including the emergence of armed groups. In September 2017, the 
first attacks on Cameroon military forces occurred. On 1 October 2017, separatist groups 
unilaterally declared independence for the Republic of Ambazonia, alongside massive 
demonstrations in which 17 protestors were killed by the security forces. The Cameroon 
military responded with occupation of the Anglophone regions, and on 
30 November 2017, after the killing of six security personnel, President Biya declared 
war on the armed separatists, describing them as ‘terrorists’ and ‘criminals’.74 The 
conflict has continued to date.
At the outset of the current crisis in 2016, civic space in Cameroon was limited but 
sufficiently open to allow various types of CSOs to register with government and operate 
legally. However, for organisations engaging in the broad political sphere, civic space 
remained largely constrained. Such organisations could operate but under strict, and at 
times self-imposed, limitations. This was especially so for those operating in the 
Anglophone regions. They understood that if they acted in a manner perceived by the 
state as oppositional and threatening, then they risked unwelcome attention and likely 
repression from state authorities.75 This became increasingly evident when the peaceful 
protests occurred in late 2016, with an immediate shrinkage of civic space. Not only was 
there a crackdown by security forces on protestors on the streets, but the organisations 
leading the protests were swiftly banned. On 17 January 2017, Cameroon’s Ministry of 
Territorial Administration issued an order banning the activities of the Southern 
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Cameroon National Council (SCNC) and the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society 
Consortium (CACSC).76 The government then arrested and imprisoned some CACSC 
leaders, while others fled the country.77 The government also severely constrained civic 
freedoms and the ability to organise with a total internet shutdown in the Anglophone 
regions for 93 days from January to April 2017.78 Since the armed conflict commenced in 
late 2017, the work of CSOs has been regularly impeded. Organisations face threats of de- 
registration and closure by the state. Individual activists and CSO leaders risk surveil-
lance, harassment, imprisonment, injury and even death.79 While state security forces are 
mainly responsible for such repressive measures, CSOs also face threats from armed 
separatist groups, with CSO staff at times (falsely) accused of colluding with the military 
and subjected to intimidation, assault and kidnapping.80 The limitation of civic space and 
silencing of civil society voices also occurs against higher-level leaders. For example, the 
government obstructed the initiative of religious leaders, led by the Archbishop Emeritus 
of Douala, Cardinal Tumi, to organise an Anglophone General Conference, firstly in 
August 2018 prior to the Major National Dialogue in late September 2018, and then again 
in November 2018, thus preventing articulation of the grievances of the English-speaking 
population.
The CIVICUS Monitor currently categorises civic space in Cameroon as ‘repressed’, 
indicating that ‘civic space is significantly constrained’, the worst but one rating from 
‘open’ to ‘closed’. While this rating is for the entire country, the constraints on civic space 
in the Anglophone regions are more intense than in other regions.81
Contributions of CSOs to conflict resolution and peacebuilding
Despite constraints to civic space, local CSOs in the English-speaking regions have 
responded in various ways to support populations affected by the conflict. Based on 
primary data, five interrelated areas are identified: humanitarian relief; peace campaigns; 
documentation of human rights violations; trauma healing; and peace education. It is 
worth noting that, while civil society actors initiate these peacebuilding efforts, the state 
must equally demonstrate its willingness to acknowledge and support these efforts if they 
are to have a national level impact in ending the conflict. As expressed by one civil society 
group: ‘We have done quite a lot but it is important to note that the government has the 
primary role in solving the conflict and we come in to act as a support system’.82
Humanitarian action
The provision of humanitarian relief is an important conflict resolution activity.83 Most 
CSOs in this study provide humanitarian relief to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and to 
civilians within the conflict zones. Some NGOs have reoriented their activities from 
development to humanitarian work. As noted by one CSO, ‘With little resources, we got 
into humanitarian support. We have been working with other organisations going into the 
bushes on a regular basis to assist IDPs with health and food items’.84 Such humanitarian 
relief was important for two reasons: basic needs and solidarity. First, it was imperative that 
CSOs responded to the urgent needs of people in most-affected communities through the 
provision of food, health services and shelter, for instance to IDPs who had fled into the 
forest and to those with less opportunity to escape the violence, such as the elderly. Second, 
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the provision of humanitarian assistance has been significant in expressing solidarity and 
enhancing the legitimacy of CSOs in their engagement with local communities and groups 
of IDPs. It has demonstrated concern and practical support for local people, and 
a preparedness to take risks by entering the conflict zones. Such risks were very real given 
the accusations and accompanying threats to humanitarian organisations from both warring 
parties that they were of providing support to the opposing side.85 While all CSO partici-
pants strongly debunked such accusations as inaccurate and unfounded,86 evidence from 
other contexts does indicate that humanitarian assistance can still be exploited and diverted 
by conflict parties themselves, usually without the involvement of local organisations.87 
Humanitarian efforts can then have the (unintended) effect of sustaining a conflict or doing 
harm. Yet data from this study suggests that this has not occurred here. In contrast, there 
was awareness by CSOs that perceived affiliation with either side would undermine their 
relief efforts and threaten their security, with agencies very conscious of the need to remain 
neutral and credible.88
Peace campaigns
The most direct contribution of CSOs to conflict resolution has been their involvement in 
campaigns for peace. Female-led CSOs, in particular, have been very active in various 
campaigns such as ‘Back to school’, ‘Stop burning health facilities’, ‘Stop the killings’, ‘We 
want dialogue’ and ‘Ceasefire’. These campaigns have been aimed at both the government 
and non-state armed groups, as well as bringing national and international attention to 
ongoing atrocities. Such campaigns were given particular impetus by the establishment in 
May 2018 of the Southwest/Northwest Women’s Task Force (SNWOT) by leaders of 
women’s organisations and individual female activists. As SNWOT states, it was ‘born as 
a result of the crisis with the mission to contribute as catalysts and agents of peace in the two 
troubled regions of Cameroon’.89 SNWOT has undertaken various activities at different 
levels. One effective action has been ‘lamentation campaigns’90 undertaken in 2018 and 2019 
in the regional capitals of Buea and Bamenda, with the participation of over one thousand 
women. This condemnation of violence and war by women publicly wailing is a revered 
conflict resolution ritual in Cameroon, and the lamentations attracted significant media 
coverage. Other public demonstrations have called for a ceasefire and peaceful resolution of 
the conflict. SNWOT has also made direct appeals to the government through holding press 
conferences and taking their demands to the capital Yaoundé. For example, on 
10 December 2018, 150 members undertook a public march in Yaoundé calling for an 
immediate ceasefire and inclusive dialogue. In the lead up to the Major National Dialogue, 
SNWOT visited the Prime Minister on 24 September 2019 to submit their recommendations 
on how dialogue could best be organised.91 When government was unresponsive, SNWOT 
persisted in demanding access and then took direct action to gain entry into the official 
Major National Dialogue sessions in Yaoundé in order to make women’s voices heard.92
A key area of campaigning by women’s organisations pertains to the gender-based 
violence that has accompanied the conflict, with CSO representatives describing the 
situation as one of ‘rampant subjection to rape’ and ‘wanton abuse of the sexual rights 
of women and girls’.93 SNWOT, for example, has consistently drawn attention to issues 
of rape and gender-based violence in its campaigns and public demonstrations. The 
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inter-related nature of public campaigning and practical support is also evident, with 
women-led CSOs providing safe spaces for women and girls, including with IDPs in the 
bush, and menstrual hygiene kits.
Documentation of human rights violations
CSOs have played a major role in documenting and reporting on human rights 
violations and other heinous crimes committed since the start of the conflict. This 
has included numerous mass killings, such as the ‘Ngarbuh massacre’ in the Northwest 
region on 14 February 2020 in which at least 27 people were killed, including 13 
children and a pregnant woman.94 Such documentation by the Centre for Human 
Rights and Democracy in Africa (CHRDA) and Network of Human Rights Defenders 
in Central Africa (REDHAC), both founded and based in Cameroon, has led to 
higher-level attention and, occasionally, an investigation being undertaken. 
Following the Ngarbuh massacre, NGO pressure led to the President setting up an 
independent commission of investigation that confirmed the responsibility of govern-
ment security forces in its report of 21 April 2020, contradicting initial denials by the 
government.95 The documentation of human rights violations and campaigns for 
investigations into war crimes makes the urgent need for a peaceful solution more 
visible, especially where mainstream media coverage, especially by the Francophone 
media, has been limited.
The work of CSOs has reminded the warring parties of their obligations under human 
rights law and afforded some protection, albeit limited, to the civilian population. One 
CSO representative stated that this may have prevented more atrocities through 
increased awareness of the consequences of violating international human rights.96 
Some human rights organisations have delivered statements on Cameroon’s 
Anglophone conflict in important international policy spaces. For instance, in 
June 2018, CHRDA presented a paper on the Anglophone crisis to the US House of 
Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs.97 Barnes contends that civil society 
initiatives are sometimes ‘crucial in directing attention to a situation that is unacceptable 
but which has been avoided by the wider public, a silence that effectively underpins the 
status quo’, adding that ‘the very act of public disclosure and/or denouncing the situation 
can make the truth evident in ways that are very difficult to ignore and may empower 
people to take action to change the situation’.98 The work of local human rights NGOs in 
Cameroon appears to have contributed in such ways.
Trauma healing
The trauma associated with contemporary wars can make peacebuilding difficult, and 
CSOs have endeavoured to provide support to trauma victims. Egbejule has indicated the 
degree of trauma suffered as a major consequence of the Cameroon Anglophone 
conflict.99 Our research confirmed this, with the leader of one youth-oriented CSO 
stating that ‘there has been an increase in mental health problems among youths as 
a result of the conflict’.100 Another CSO leader noted that: ‘the elderly, people that have 
experienced kidnapping, those with gun wounds, people whose houses and/or businesses 
have been destroyed, all are suffering from post-traumatic stress disorders’.101 The 
10 N. ANNAN ET AL.
pervasive incidents of rape and gender-based violence is another source of trauma. 
Workshop participants agreed on the widespread trauma caused by the lived experiences 
of the Anglophone population since the start of the conflict, and of the healing processes 
required to relate with wider society in a peaceful manner.102 In response, CSOs have 
provided psychological and mental health support to those affected by the conflict, 
especially to women and children.103 For example, a consortium of four CSOs has 
established a network in the city of Kumba to provide psychosocial support and the 
referral of victims/survivors of gender-based violence.104 The objective of such healing is 
to help those affected to get relief from their pain and prevent potential conflict beha-
viour. Although there is limited research on the relevance of psychosocial relief in 
resolving conflicts,105 Bigdon and Korf identify trauma therapy as one of the activities 
by which NGOs can contribute to long term transformative change in conflict 
situations.106
Peace education
CSOs have designed and implemented peace education/sensitisation programmes. One 
organisation, for example, carried out training on peace education in the village of a staff 
member which had been burnt down by the military, with the aim of convincing the 
youths not to retaliate. The same organisation also organised a ‘seminar to educate the 
victims and try to make them understand that all hope is not lost’.107 Another participant 
reported that, ‘CSOs have been training youths and women on community mediation 
skills to be able to talk to their brothers, sisters and children in armed groups to drop 
their arms’.108 Findings from other studies, for instance that by Awinador-Kanyirige109 
in northern Ghana, have argued that peace education by CSOs helped to de-escalate 
ethnic-based conflicts. Similarly, Fischer reported that some CSOs in post-conflict Bosnia 
became ‘active in cross-border peace education, striving to establish norms of tolerance 
and deal with prejudices and enemy images’.110
Challenges faced by CSOs
CSOs in Cameroon have faced significant constraints since the mass protests in 2016, 
notably administrative restrictions and intimidation and violence, inclusive of both legal/ 
regulatory and extra-legal/repressive measures. Internal discords within the CSO sector 
are an additional constraint noted here.
Administrative restrictions and control
Administrative restrictions were noted by participants as a major means of limiting 
CSOs’ access to conflict-affected communities. These included discretionary measures 
accorded to military and government personnel that enable them to restrict movement in 
the conflict zones. For example, a recurrent issue for most CSOs was that ‘Divisional 
[administrative] Officers do not issue authorisation for CSOs to carry out activities in 
their various constituencies’.111 In other words, local officials could refuse to grant access 
to CSOs to visit conflict-affected areas, especially remote locations. This impedes CSOs’ 
ability to address the needs of the most marginalised and vulnerable people in the 
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 11
conflict. Even when granted access, CSOs were often faced with surveillance and control. 
One representative noted that: ‘The military interferes in the humanitarian deliveries of 
CSOs by sometimes wanting to accompany them to the field and by so doing endanger-
ing the lives of their staff through crossfire exchange with the Amba [non-state armed 
groups] boys’.112 While the military frames its accompaniment of CSO teams to rural 
locations as protection of CSO staff, the main intent is seen as surveillance of CSOs and 
their engagement with local communities, thereby exerting indirect control over their 
activities. As noted, some CSOs have been accused by government of being ‘separatist 
sympathisers’ or working with separatist fighters, with staff monitored and questioned by 
the state secret service.113 Such (false) allegations are intended to stigmatise and de- 
legitimise CSOs. Human rights NGOs, such as CHRDA, are particularly prone to 
attempts at de-legitimisation through accusations of bias when they document atrocities 
committed by state forces.114
Another administrative restriction is the censorship imposed on CSO activities. 
Participants noted that the government, through officials at the sub-district, district 
and regional levels, prevent CSOs from sharing information on the situation of people 
in the affected communities. A respondent noted that CSOs face a ‘communication 
challenge [where] CSOs are not allowed to provide relevant information emanating 
from the field’.115 This could be an attempt by the state to remain as sole provider of 
the narrative on the Anglophone conflict, silencing the voices of civil society actors. The 
consequences of violating such state censorship range from fines to imprisonment or an 
outright organisational ban, as meted out to CACSC.
Intimidation and violence
Governmental administrative restrictions on movement also have an intimidatory effect 
on CSOs. Such challenges are heightened when there is a direct threat to life and 
property, which can come from both warring parties. Discussions with CSOs’ represen-
tatives revealed that such risks are high in situations where ‘the military on their part 
considers everybody as an enemy and they shoot indiscriminately and do not seem to 
protect members of civil society’.116 In addition, CSO premises can be targeted. For 
instance, offices of the Network of Human Rights Defenders in Central Africa 
(REDHAC), based in Douala, has been broken into by unidentified armed men on 
several occasions, with documents and equipment confiscated on other occasions, and 
staff subjected to harassment and intimidation. Although reported to the police, no 
formal investigation has taken place,117 and this fate has also befallen other CSOs in 
Cameroon.118 Such threats come not only from state forces, or unidentified provocateurs 
acting on its behalf, but NGO staff are also targeted at times by the non-state armed 
groups. The real nature of this threat was evident in that two members of CSOs present at 
the workshop had been kidnapped by separatist groups.119 Very frightening experiences 
for both individuals, they had required time to recover from physical injuries and, 
especially, from the mental trauma.120 Such risks clearly impact on CSOs’ ability to 
effectively carry out their activities towards conflict resolution, echoing evidence from 
other studies that a threat to basic security for CSO staff makes it ‘difficult for them to 
engage in and support peace making’.121
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CSO-government relations and sector discord
While most challenges come from external sources, another constraint was the internal 
divisions between CSOs, often provoked by governmental manipulation and shrinking 
space. This relates to what TNI describes as ‘shades of shrinking space: not everyone’s space 
is shrinking in the same way’ and to the politics of shrinking space.122 The representative of 
a teachers’ organisation noted that CSOs’ autonomy and ability to contribute to peaceful 
change was partly dependent on CSOs’ own decisions concerning their relations with 
government. The participant stated that some CSOs are effectively government- 
sponsored or at least maintain close relations with government and that: ‘under such 
conditions, it is difficult for such CSOs to make meaningful contributions because they 
dance to the tune of the government’.123 However, some workshop participants went 
further in their critique, suggesting that some CSOs seek to strengthen their own position 
through closeness to government. Participants suggested that such CSOs ‘don’t have the 
spirit to look beyond a selfish, self-centred perspective’.124 This was also referred to as the 
‘pull him down syndrome’, in terms of seeking a competitive advantage for your own 
organisation through the denigration of other organisations.125 Perhaps the banning of 
CACSC and imprisonment of its leaders has intimidated others, enforcing compliance and 
conformity, and resulting in a successful ‘divide and rule’ strategy by government. Another 
interpretation could point to clientelism within civil society and the attractiveness of being 
close to government patrons.126 Nonetheless, this ‘lack of synergy among CSOs’ in conflict 
resolution efforts makes the collective voice of CSOs weaker and undermines effective 
collaboration.127
It is undeniable that CSOs in Anglophone Cameroon operate in a difficult environ-
ment. Civic space was already restricted pre-conflict and has become increasingly con-
strained in the context of conflict. There are risks to the personal security of staff and 
existential threats to the organisations. Such threats come from powerful, armed actors, 
both state and non-state. In such circumstances, CSOs have little choice but to work 
within government-imposed parameters, while being somewhat creative in their inter-
pretation. Yet there are also difficult choices. Some CSOs opt to gravitate more towards 
government as a way of promoting their own interests, but resulting in disharmony with 
those that remain more critical and independent.
Responses to counter shrinking civic space
CSO participants shared ways they have sought to counter shrinking spaces, identifying 
the following: awareness raising; documentation; mobilisation; networking and coalition- 
building; dialogue and communication. We examine these efforts with reference to the 
categories of responses to shrinking civic space outlined above. These local CSO strategies 
also highlight examples of both ‘claimed spaces’ and ‘created spaces’ by civil society actors. 
As defined by Gaventa, these are spaces for political participation where ‘claimed spaces’ 
are those ‘claimed by less powerful actors from or against the power holders’, while 
‘created spaces’ are ‘created more autonomously by them [less powerful actors]’.128
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Awareness raising by CSOs
Participants felt that hostility towards CSOs by both warring sides was sometimes due to 
limited knowledge and understanding of their role. Difficulty in obtaining support outside 
of the Anglophone regions for CSO conflict resolution initiatives was also explained by the 
limited awareness of the conflict within Francophone Cameroon. For this reason, women’s 
groups took their demands to Yaoundé on 18 April 2019 to raise awareness on the need to 
end the fighting and engage in conflict resolution efforts.129 Increased understanding of 
the legitimacy of their activities was also considered crucial by two human rights organisa-
tions. They suggested that CSOs needed to raise awareness of the conflict and simulta-
neously of the legitimacy of their role among both stakeholders and the wider citizen body 
using various channels, including social media and traditional media.130
Such attempts fit well with the concept of ‘resistance’ in which CSOs seek to increase 
their accountability to citizens and thereby to strengthen their legitimacy.131 It also tends 
to confirm the argument of Ayvazyan that raising ‘awareness for the plight of civil society 
with the public is of great importance’.132 Similarly, in a study of CSOs’ efforts to prevent 
civic space restrictions, Baldus et al. found that awareness-raising campaigns, together 
with advocacy and targeted lobbying, were key to success.133
Documentation and quality of data
The closure of civic spaces can serve to conceal the atrocities that occur in civil war 
situations. Therefore, sustained documentation of violent events, including human rights 
violations, was seen as crucial, despite the risks posed to individuals and organisations. 
Two aspects were considered key to enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness of such 
efforts, as well as protecting personal security. The first was to link documentation of 
abuses by both warring sides to international human rights law, and to send information 
of violations to international human rights organisations such as Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch. Relating abuses to international human rights law makes the 
information more comprehensible for international human rights organisations.134 
Networking with international human rights organisations can draw the attention of the 
warring sides to the consequences of violating international law and the legal requirement 
to prevent atrocities.135 Such networking also provides some protection to local human 
rights organisations against retaliation from both warring sides in a context where their 
work is perceived as ‘confrontational’ and their security regularly threatened.136 
The second aspect was to ensure the accuracy of all such data. The representative of one 
human rights organisation noted that ‘facts’ obtained from social media sources should 
always be checked for accuracy, and emphasised the importance of having reliable local 
people on the ground to verify reports of atrocities. Another workshop participant stated 
that CSOs ‘cannot speak until they have the facts’ and ‘when government knows that what 
they [CSOs] are saying is true, then they cannot contest it’.137
In such ways, organisations seek to counter the attempted de-legitimisation of their 
role by government. This response provides examples of ‘adaptation’, ‘collaboration’ and 
‘solidarity’ rolled into one. Framing violent atrocities as human rights abuses, especially 
those suffered by civilians, sends a clear message to perpetrators concerning legal 
obligations and potential repercussions. Being scrupulous about the accuracy of 
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information, especially in an age of misinformation on social media, enhances CSOs’ 
credibility and legitimacy. Sharing the information with international organisations 
increases its dissemination to a global audience, and enables international groups to 
display ‘solidarity’, as noted in the TNI report,138 with those local human rights defenders 
whose personal security is threatened.
Mobilisation, networking and coalition-building
Mobilisation, networking and coalition-building are closely related, with the aim of 
creating more effective agency in the face of constraints and attempted de- 
legitimisation by the state. Workshop participants emphasised the benefits of working 
together and conversely it was perceived as difficult for CSOs to achieve impact if they 
operated in isolation.139 Networking took place locally as well as nationally and inter-
nationally, including strong links with international organisations.140 One outcome of 
networking can be the creation of coalitions of like-minded organisations, with successful 
examples being SNWOT and the Civil Society Platform for Peace in Cameroon.
SNWOT was formed in May 2018 as a coalition of over 150 representatives of 
women’s organisations and individual activists. By bringing together a number of 
organisations and individuals to focus on one issue – the conflict and its adverse impact 
on women – SNWOT has made a significant impact at various levels. At the local level, 
SNWOT has ‘mobilised grassroots women’s groups in areas plagued by current 
conflict’.141 It sensitised such groups ‘on different issues related to their security, health, 
reproductive health, sexual rights, especially within the context of conflict’, with local 
women ‘becoming more aware of their rights’, notably around gender-based violence.142 
At the regional and national levels, SNWOT has engaged in imaginative public demon-
strations and sit-down protests, notably the ‘lamentation campaigns’, as well as direct 
action, for instance to gain access to the Major National Dialogue. Representatives stated 
that self-organisation and mobilisation as women given them the courage to take such 
direct action.143 Further, SNWOT’s activism ‘drew a lot of media attention at both 
national and international levels’144 to a largely neglected conflict. SNWOT certainly 
provides an excellent example of what Karaman and Cernov145 referred to as activists ‘re- 
imagining their strategies’ and ‘reclaiming democratic spaces’. The formation of the Civil 
Society Platform for Peace in Cameroon created a coalition of over 30 youth-led 
organisations, bloggers and journalists. Its strength in numbers has reinforced its calls 
for an immediate ceasefire and genuine inclusive dialogue, and provided impetus to its 
‘Back to School’ campaign.146 There was general agreement among workshop partici-
pants on the importance of coalition building in order to influence policies and decision- 
making. It was suggested that each CSO should focus on a particular ‘niche’ area and then 
come together in a united coalition in a synergistic way where different areas of expertise 
can be complementary. This corresponds with the ‘adaptation’ strategy of ‘building 
alliances with peers to exchange information and coordinate responses to repression’.147
Other CSOs have also engaged in local-level mobilisation, particularly thorough 
training. For example, workshops on peacebuilding and economic empowerment for 
women have been organised by Mother of Hope Cameroon,148 and on peacebuilding and 
countering violent extremism for young people by Local Youth Corner.149 Other 
women-led organisations have undertaken rights education with young women and 
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girls on gender-based violence (GBV) and other sexual rights.150 In such ways, CSOs 
have created local spaces for discussion and education on pertinent topics with the aim of 
strengthening local people’s ability to intervene and reduce incidences of violence.
However, it must be noted that such examples of mobilisation are generally unconten-
tious, and remain within the limits of what is acceptable to government. SNWOT is 
probably the foremost example of resistance to the unprecedented violence in the 
Anglophone regions, yet its actions and public protests have been largely tolerated by 
government, without mass arrests or disruption. It may be that SNWOT learnt from the 
fate of CACSC at the beginning of the crisis. CACSC was established as an alliance of CSOs 
in December 2016 to be a voice for the Anglophone population and to lead the peaceful 
protests. However, CACSC’s advocacy of a return to the two-state federation, as created at 
independence in 1961, could not be countenanced by the government. In response, as 
noted above, the state reverted to brutal suppression of the protests, with the banning of 
CACSC and detention of its leaders in January 2017. Subsequently it was evident to CSOs 
that there were limits to their mobilisation, and any advocacy that questioned the present 
form of the state would result in severe repression. SNWOT and other CSOs appear to have 
adapted accordingly, adopting strictly non-violent methods and limiting their advocacy to 
ending the violence. This concurs again with the ‘adaptation’ strategy of ‘adopting less 
confrontational lobbying campaigns, applying a degree of self-censorship and working 
within the framework of . . . (formal or informal) agreement with the authorities’.151 This 
strategy of SNWOT and others has made it difficult for the state to respond aggressively 
with arrests and suppression of protest, but leaves them unable to address the root causes of 
the conflict and the longstanding grievances of the Anglophone population.
Dialogue and communication
Dialogue and communication at various levels was another important strategy pursued by 
CSOs that aimed to counter shrinking space by creating alternative space. Dialogue 
occurred with different types of stakeholders. Dialogue with people in local communities 
was prioritised by some organisations, while others focused on encouraging government 
officials to organise a more inclusive dialogue towards a peace agreement.152 Community- 
level dialogue has engaged particularly with women. One focus of local dialogue has been 
on getting ‘armed groups to drop their weapons’.153 Despite government restrictions, some 
CSOs have been able to access areas where the conflict is intense and undertake dialogue 
with most affected communities about the conflict, its impact and how to resolve it. 
Workshop participants agreed it was imperative that local people’s voices should be 
heard directly – what is necessary is ‘not a dialogue in Yaoundé but in communities’.154 
CSOs then saw their role as feeding back the perspectives of those most affected people to 
government officials at local and national levels, not least because political representation 
has failed. There is evidence here of the strategy of ‘combining advocacy work and service 
delivery’,155 with the added aim of channelling local people’s perspectives and experiences 
of the conflict to governmental authorities and to the world at large.
Some CSOs have also met with representatives of separatist groups and with government 
officials in attempts to persuade them to cease fire and negotiate. CSOs have initiated 
discussions with regional governors in the Northwest and Southwest regions aimed at 
bringing local perspectives to their attention.156 Such efforts at open communication and 
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dialogue were considered important for countering the suspicions of both warring sides – 
those of the armed separatists of CSOs working for the government; and those of the 
government of CSOs being oppositional and/or working with the armed groups. In this 
way, CSOs have ‘claimed spaces’ through seeking dialogue with powerful actors, talking 
with both sides in a peaceful manner in which NGOs can be the ‘voice of the people’.157
Conclusion
Through the case of the Anglophone conflict in Cameroon, this paper has explored 
a paradox – the role of CSOs in peacebuilding from below in the context of shrinking 
civic space. We asked three questions, and findings are as follows.
First, in examining contributions towards conflict resolution, we noted how 
Cameroonian CSOs in the two English-speaking regions have responded with huma-
nitarian assistance, documented the violence and atrocities experienced daily, and 
engaged in peace campaigns and conflict resolution activities. Some NGOs have 
entirely refocused their activities on the conflict setting, while new coalitions have 
emerged, most notably SNWOT, with the specific aim of ending the violence. We 
regard the various conflict-oriented activities as contributing to conflict resolution, 
both indirectly and directly. The provision of humanitarian assistance is an expression 
of basic humanity and solidarity with most-affected communities, essential for any 
attempt at peacebuilding from below. The traumatic experiences of civilians in the 
conflict zones are articulated by CSOs in various fora, enabling local people’s voices to 
be heard. The documentation of atrocities and human rights violations by the warring 
sides, most notably against civilians, is vital in creating an accurate record of this 
neglected conflict and drawing international attention to it. Peace campaigns and 
protests, such as the lamentations campaign, have contributed more directly to 
conflict resolution efforts, maintaining pressure for a negotiated settlement through 
inclusive dialogue. Therefore, particularly in a civil war context like Cameroon where 
the government has been unresponsive to international mediation attempts, it is 
evident that peacebuilding from below by CSOs can play an important role, though 
one whose effectiveness is limited while government remains wedded to a military 
outcome.
Secondly, it is clear that peacebuilding from below can be constrained and limited 
under conditions of shrinking civic space. Despite some political liberalisation in the 
early 1990s, civic space in Cameroon has remained restricted under President Biya’s 
autocratic rule. Oppositional space has been closed in particular for organisations that 
question the marginalisation of Anglophone citizens within Cameroon. In many 
respects, the exclusion and repression associated with ‘shrinking space’ has long existed 
for these organisations, confirming the point made by TNI.158 Yet the closure of space 
has intensified since the present crisis emerged in 2016, and CSOs have experienced 
significant additional constraints, many pertaining to the characteristics of ‘shrinking 
civic space’ identified in the scholarly literature.159 Freedom of expression has been 
curtailed, with open discussion of the form of the Cameroonian state, such as a return 
to a federal system, effectively prohibited. CSOs self-censor in the knowledge that to do 
otherwise would lead to existential threats to their organisations and to personal 
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security. CSOs have been subject to state surveillance, stigmatisation and de- 
legitimisation through intimidation and accusations of bias, as well as kidnappings 
by armed separatist groups.
Further, as noted earlier, although peacebuilding from below can be crucial to 
sustainable peace, it is not without imperfections and is saddled with complexities. 
Actors within this sector can be fragmented, enforce harmful practices, be politicised 
or become channels for violence.160 The DRC, Burundi, and Syria are cases in point.161 
Such incidences have also contributed to criticism of the ‘local’ as undemocratic and 
illiberal.162 In this study of Cameroon, any suggestion that local humanitarian actors 
have taken sides or enabled violence were soundly rebuffed by CSO participants. Despite 
the warnings of Ramsbotham et al., there was no evidence that CSOs here were anything 
other than benign actors.163 Yet the fragility and complexity of violent contexts indicates 
the susceptibility of CSOs to be manipulated or exploited by violent actors, and the need 
for constant vigilance against this.
Yet, thirdly, despite these challenges, CSOs have responded in various imaginative and 
peaceful ways in attempts to reduce the impact of shrinking space and to create new 
spaces in which to advocate for peace. Freedoms of assembly and expression have been 
reasserted by women’s groups like SNWOT through peaceful public protests. 
Mobilisation into coalitions has strengthened campaigning activities. International lin-
kages have been leveraged, notably by human rights organisations, in order to dissemi-
nate information on atrocities to international audiences, as well as to provide some self- 
protection against possible reprisals. Spaces have been created to interact with most- 
affected communities, inclusive of young people at risk from both the security forces and 
the armed separatist groups. Spaces have been claimed in attempts to dialogue with the 
protagonists in the conflict. CSOs’ responses have chimed with the ‘resistance’ and 
‘adaptation’ measures outlined by Bossuyt and Ronceray,164 and also entail CSOs creat-
ing spaces ‘to meet, collaborate and learn from each other’, as noted by Karaman and 
Cernov.165 ‘Resistance’ has been evident in the mobilisation by women’s groups, inclu-
sive of non-violent street protests, while it is notable that such advocacy campaigns have 
sought to avoid repression by focusing on ending violence and the abuses experienced by 
women. CSOs have steered clear of advocacy of potential political solutions to the conflict 
that would likely result in arrest and detention. ‘Adaptation’ has been displayed by NGOs 
that have shifted to humanitarian relief work, thereby meeting essential needs and also 
providing first-hand evidence on the conflict’s impact on most-affected groups to utilise 
in lobbying campaigns.
This research has contributed to scholarly literature on ‘peacebuilding from below’ 
and on ‘shrinking civic space’. Peacebuilding from below is not without its difficulties, 
and the phenomenon of shrinking civic space in authoritarian contexts adds to its 
complexities. This particular type of civil conflict, where the Cameroon state is unyield-
ing to international pressure and apparently intent on a military solution, is especially 
challenging. The space for civic action is limited in various ways. The most significant 
constraint is on CSOs’ freedom of expression. It is impossible for them to openly discuss 
the root causes of the conflict and therefore of possible political solutions, such as 
a return to federalism or greater autonomy for the English-speaking regions. Yet, despite 
such difficulties, this study highlights the importance of the contributions of CSOs 
working for peace. Our findings are that CSOs’ role has been at least three-fold: to 
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engage with most-affected communities and build an evidence base of the conflict’s 
adverse impact on citizens; to draw national and international attention to the conflict; 
and to maintain pressure for a negotiated settlement through interactions with both 
warring parties. CSOs play a key role in facilitating the expression of a variety of voices 
from below and in mediating between local communities and regional and national-level 
peace negotiation processes.
The research has also contributed to our understanding of local responses to shrinking 
civic space in conflict situations. Recent literature has conceptualised different types of 
local responses. The Cameroon case has largely confirmed the relevance of these cate-
gories, providing empirical examples of ‘adaptation’ and ‘resistance’ and thereby giving 
substance to Bossuyt and Ronceray’s theoretical framework.166 The research has also 
demonstrated instances of CSOs’ ‘re-imagining their strategies’,167 and the importance of 
international solidarity.168 Further, this research has provided evidence that the forma-
tion of coalitions of CSOs to specifically campaign for conflict resolution is a particularly 
effective and appropriate organisational form, both strengthening advocacy and provid-
ing some self-protection. Additionally, the unique contribution of women’s organisa-
tions in advocating for peace is especially significant. The study has highlighted the 
severity of the constraints on CSOs and the real existential threats they face, limiting what 
they can say and do, while simultaneously indicating how CSOs in Cameroon have 
demonstrated a determination and an ability to advocate for peaceful resolution of 
conflict in flexible and imaginative ways as opportunities emerge.
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